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Understanding Others
The Person Model Theory
Albert Newen
According to Interaction Theory (IT), neither Theory Theory (TT) nor Simulation
Theory (ST) give an adequate account of how we understand others. Their shared
defect, it is claimed, is that both focus on third-person observation of the other,
and neglect the role of social interaction. While interaction theory is made to ac-
count for the latter, it has problems doing justice to explicit attributions of propos-
itional attitudes, especially from an observational stance. The latter received a
new explanation by the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) which focuses on
story-based explanations  and tends  to  underestimate the relevance of  nonlin-
guistic intuitive understanding. In this paper, I first try to do justice to what is
plausible about each of the four approaches by accepting that each account intro-
duces one plausible epistemic strategy for understanding others, which leads us
to a multiplicity view about the epistemic strategies for understanding others. But
it will then be argued that an adequate theory of understanding others needs fur-
ther adjustment and correction because we need to account for the fact that we
usually understand others on the basis of specific background knowledge that be-
comes more enriched during our life; I thus propose Person Model Theory (PMT)
as a fruitful alternative. On my account, understanding turns on developing “per-
son models” of ourselves, of other individuals, and of groups. These person models
are the basis on which we register and evaluate persons as having mental as well
as physical properties. I argue that person models can be either implicitly repres-
ented or explicitly available. This is accounted for by describing two kinds of per-
son model, corresponding to the two ways of understanding others; very early in
life we develop implicit person schemata, where a person schema is an implicitly-
represented unity of sensory-motor abilities and basic mental phenomena related
to one human being (or a group of humans); and we also develop person images,
where a person image is a unity of explicitly-registered mental and physical phe-
nomena related to one human being (or a group). I argue that the person model
theory has more explanatory power than the other candidates.
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1 Introduction
A key question for social cognition is: Can we
provide an adequate theoretical analysis of the
process of understanding other human beings?
For over twenty years, there have been only two
possible answers to this question—that offered
by “Theory Theory”, and that of “Simulation
Theory”. The central claim of TT is that one’s
understanding of another essentially relies on a
folk-psychological  theory,  where some take the
position that the relevant folk psychology is in-
born  (e.g.,  Baron-Cohen 1995),  while  others
claim that it is acquired (Gopnik 1993). In con-
trast,  ST holds that we understand others by
means  of  simulation (e.g.,  Goldman 2006),
where simulation can take place at two levels,
referred to as low-level and high-level simulation
(Goldman 2006).  In  recent  years,  however,  it
has become clear that both positions have signi-
ficant  limitations.  One  central  problem  is
claimed  to  be  that  both  TT and  ST take  a
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primarily observational stance towards the other
when analysing understanding:1 critics maintain
that this observational stance is a nonstandard,
intellectual perspective, and that in fact we are
normally involved in interaction when we try to
understand  others.  Developing  this  line  of
thought,  Gallagher’s  interaction  theory  (2001)
combines involvement in interaction with a dir-
ect perception thesis, such that we can directly
perceive the mental states of others and do not
have  to  infer  them.  Another  alternative  pro-
posal is  Hutto’s  narrative account of social un-
derstanding  (2008),  on  which  understanding
others relies centrally on telling or understand-
ing  stories.  These  idealized  positions  are  the
bases for a wide range of mixed positions, with
which I will engage shortly. Yet even if we con-
sider only these idealized positions, a new cent-
ral defect quickly becomes clear:  namely, that
these positions offer answers to rather different
questions. Thus, in a first step, I aim to reor-
ganize the field of the main positions and use
this framework to situate my own view, which I
refer to as the  person model theory (Newen &
Schlicht 2009; Newen & Vogeley 2011): this ac-
count is characterized by the claim that we un-
derstand others by essentially relying on person
models of individuals, or of groups.
2 Reshaping the field of positions by 
distinguishing central questions
The question “How do we understand other hu-
man  beings?”  has  to  be  divided  into  several
subquestions,  the first  of  which is:  What epi-
stemic strategy do we adopt to register or assess
the other’s cognitive states? To reach any kind
of assessment of the other we need to obtain in-
formation  within  a  concrete  situation.  The
second question is: Once obtained, how is this
prior  information  stored  and  organized?  This
1 This  is  a  simplified  view.  A  closer  look  into  Gopnik &  Meltzoff
(1997) shows that their  version of TT accounts for interaction as
part of the development of an understanding of action and agency
(Chap. 5). But interaction is not accounted for in the further dimen-
sions of understanding others. From a bird’s eye view this character-
ization is  not  inadequate,  although  it  needs  qualification.  As  the
reader will see, my person model theory integrates this initial under-
standing of action and agency as elements of forming implicit person
models that at the beginning may not be rich and abstract enough
to warrant being called a theory (see n. 6 below).
second aspect is important, because we always
rely on prior background knowledge in our as-
sessments of others. One main defect of the de-
bate thus far has turns on the failure to distin-
guish these two questions. The debate between
the  two  classic  positions,  ST  and  TT,  can
roughly  be  described  as  a  misunderstanding
stemming  from  their  dealing  with  different
questions: while ST insists that the use of simu-
lation is the standard epistemic strategy, TT in-
sists that the prior information we have about
others is organized as a folk-psychological the-
ory.  Concerning  their  main  claims,  these  ac-
counts  are  not  in  opposition.  The  opposition
only becomes visible if for each account we con-
sider their favoured answer to both questions.
The classic opposition between ST and TT can
then be described as follows: TT claims that the
epistemic strategy relies upon theory-based in-
ferences, and that the prior information is or-
ganized as a folk-psychological theory; while ST
claims  that  the  strategy  for  information-pro-
cessing involves simulation (to put oneself into
the other person’s shoes) which draws only on
my own experience  as  the  source  of  data  for
simulation, leaving it open as to whether these
data form a theory.
Before turning to the question of which in-
formation-processing strategy we use to under-
stand others, I first provide a brief survey of the
field. Thus, in addition to TT and ST, we have
Gallagher’s  IT,  which  focuses  only  on  the
strategy question; it claims that we understand
others through social interaction and/or by dir-
ect  perception,  i.e.,  we  can  directly  perceive
mental  phenomena;  we  also  have  Hutto’s  ac-
count, which is given in terms of story-telling.
Their  more  elaborate  joint  account  combines
these claims (Gallagher &  Hutto 2008), main-
taining that we can distinguish three epistemic
strategies  for  understanding others,  depending
on the stage of cognitive development in onto-
geny: direct perception in very early childhood,
followed by interactional understanding, and fi-
nally narrative understanding (Hutto 2008). In
contrast, my aim will be to show that we actu-
ally use a multiplicity of information-processing
strategies  to  understand others,  depending  on
the context; the proposed account, then, is even
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richer than the three strategies proposed by the
joint account of Hutto and Gallagher.
3 The epistemic strategy for 
understanding others
3.1 What about simulation? 
According to Goldman’s (2006) elaborate simu-
lation  account,  we  must  distinguish  between
low-level  and  high-level  mindreading.
“Mindreading”, in his view, comprises all cases
of evaluating the mental state(s) of another per-
son that normally lead to a language-based at-
tribution of a mental state to a person. In the
case of high-level mindreading, this is 
[…] mindreading with one or more of the
following  features:  (a)  it  targets  mental
states of a relatively complex nature, such
as propositional attitudes; (b) some com-
ponents  of  the  mindreading  process  are
subject to voluntary control; and (c) the
process has some degree of accessibility to
consciousness. (Goldman 2006, p. 147) 
The paradigmatic case of high-level mindread-
ing is understanding another person’s decision.
Third-person attribution of a decision consists
of:
• imagining  propositional  attitudes  in  a
form of enactment imagination;
• using (the same) decision-making mech-
anisms (as in the first-person case);
• projecting the result of using that mech-
anism onto a third person by attributing
a decision.
We can easily present cases in which these pro-
posed essential steps are not involved. For (i),
to understand a person suffering from a delu-
sion of persecution, we are not able to deploy
enactment imagination:  Their  case is  just  too
different  from  our  own  experience.  And  the
same may be true in cases of deep cultural dif-
ference. For (ii), if I have experience with the
other person such that I know that he has idio-
syncratic,  non-rational  decision-making  habits
when  making  weekend  plans,  I  can  use  this
knowledge  to  model  his  decision  and  not  my
own decision-making apparatus, since I have ex-
perience that my own apparatus differs from his
(at  least  concerning weekend plans).  For (iii),
grant for the sake of argument that we have a
plausible candidate for the beliefs and desires of
the other and we use this for enactment imagin-
ation as well as input for my own decision-mak-
ing apparatus,  thus reaching a decision to do
action A. Then, according to Goldman, I should
project this decision onto the other person. Yet
there remains an essential gap, which is noted
by Goldman but not adequately addressed by
him: He observes the necessity of  “quarantin-
ing”  my  idiosyncratic  background  beliefs  if  I
want to come to an adequate projection of the
decision to do action A. Suppose I am warran-
ted in presupposing that the other wants an ice-
cream, has money, and that there is a nearby
cafeteria  where  he  can  get  one:  then  the  de-
cision-making apparatus may come to the de-
cision to buy an ice-cream. If, however, I am a
person  who  is  extremely  parsimonious  with
money, then my own background desire to save
money  may prevent  me  from buying  the  ice-
cream in the same situation, and so this inter-
venes and I do not attribute the decision to buy
an ice-cream to the other. But it seems that the
desire  to  save  money  is—often,  at  least—an
idiosyncratic desire that I should not use in my
projection. Yet how do I know which of my own
beliefs and desires are idiosyncratic and do not
relate to the person I aim to understand? To
solve this problem, I must already possess some
view about the attitudes of the other as com-
pared to me; yet this was what we were aiming
to understand. In general, then, Goldman’s the-
ory  of  high-level  mindreading  has  difficulties
even getting off the ground: It starts by making
presuppositions about the beliefs and desires of
the other person, where this is exactly what we
were aiming to understand. The same problem
appears again in the projection phase, as just il-
lustrated.  Thus,  high-level  mindreading  is  a
very special case of simulating a decision of the
other,  specifically  when I  already  know a  lot
about the other, which I can use as input. This
leaves open the question of how we get this in-
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formation at all. Goldman tries to account for
problems of this kind by accepting the import-
ance  of  inference-based  strategies  and the  or-
ganization of the prior information in form of a
theory. Thus he is no longer developing a pure
simulation theory but rather a hybrid account.
Nevertheless, the counterexamples are not rare
but  in  fact  quite  typical,  and thus  they  cast
doubt  on  the  typicality  and  pervasiveness  of
high-level simulation in mindreading decisions.
Goldman may,  however,  appeal  to  his
strategy  of  low-level  mindreading,  which  is
characterized as an activity that is “comparat-
ively simple, primitive, automatic, and largely
below  the  level  of  consciousness”  (2006,  p.
113).  Goldman  uses  as  a  paradigmatic  case
face-based  recognition  of  emotion,  and  he
makes  an  additional  appeal  to  “mirror  neur-
ons”,  proposing  that  mirror  neurons  are  not
only relevant in the case of understanding mo-
tor  activities  (in  both  observing  and  doing
them) but also for recognizing mental phenom-
ena like pain and disgust. The most elaborate
case relevant to this area of discussion concerns
the study of disgust: It has been shown that
experiencing disgust and observing disgust are
dependent on certain mirror neurons that are
activated in  both cases  (Wicker et  al. 2003).
Yet what exactly can we learn from this obser-
vation? I develop a critical position on the ex-
planatory potential  of  mirror  neurons  in  two
steps.  First,  I  argue  that  if  mirror  neurons
could provide us with the whole story of how
we understand others, this story would not be
given  as  a  case  of  simulation.  Second,  I  cite
evidence  that  mirror  neurons  do  not  provide
the  core  part  of  the  story  of  understanding
others in cases of understanding emotions. Let
us start with criticism of the claim that low-
level mindreading is a case of simulation. Here
I mainly rely on lines of criticism worked out
by Gallagher (2007), who claims that “simula-
tion is a personal-level concept that cannot be
legitimately applied to subpersonal processes”
(p. 363). Even if we do not accept Gallagher’s
claim,  the  two  core  features  of  simulation
would be lacking in the case of resonance pro-
cesses implemented by mirror neurons: There is
neither a first-person perspective involved nor
a type of  pretence that includes a projection
from a first-person perspective to a third-per-
son perspective: “Thus, according to ST, simu-
lation involves the instrumental use of a first-
person model to form a third-person ‘as if’ or a
‘pretend’  mental  state.  For  subpersonal  pro-
cesses, however, both of these characterizations
fail” (Gallagher 2007, p. 360). Why are mirror
neurons not an essential part of understanding
others?  They  represent  a  type  of  action  or
emotion  that  is  independent  from a  first-  or
third-person  perspective;  but  the  distinction
between self  and other is an essential part of
understanding others.  Thus a simulation pro-
cess  cannot  be  fully  captured  in  its  essential
aspects  by  the  mirror-neuron  processes  (see
Vogeley & Newen 2002). 
This  criticism of  high-level  and low-level
mindreading  does  not  imply  that  simulation
processes  never  take  place:  rather,  it  suggests
that  it  is  only  so-called  high-level  simulation
that we can characterize as simulation, and also
that  it  is  implausible  that  simulation  is  the
standard strategy for everyday understanding of
others. The latter claim is also based on the ob-
servation that we often rely on automatic, intu-
itive understanding of others without any con-
scious considerations. 
3.2 What about theory-based inferences?
The same general line of criticism can be de-
veloped  with  respect  to  theory-based  infer-
ences. Such inferences may sometimes be rel-
evant, but are not always so; neither are they
the standard strategy for understanding oth-
ers.  Theory-based  inferences  are  important
when  we  are  confronted  with  cases  that  we
find  strange  or  surprising,  i.e.,  situations
where we meet another person suffering from
a  mental  disease  which  we  know  nothing
about, or where the person belongs to a cul-
ture that  is  radically  different  from ours.  In
such  scenarios,  we  consciously  build  hypo-
theses about the relevant mental phenomena,
as well as about the best behavioural strategy
to  adopt.  But  most  everyday  scenarios  in
which  we  understand  others  are  not  of  this
type; quite the contrary, we are generally in-
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volved in well-known situations with individu-
als or types of persons with whom we are fa-
miliar. There is an effortless application of our
know-how  regarding  dealing  with  other  hu-
mans, without any need to rationalize through
theory-based inferences. The reply of the ad-
vocate of TT would be: Even if  the relevant
knowledge-how  does  not  involve  an  explicit
theory-based  inference,  it  is  only  applicable
because we rely on implicit theory-based infer-
ences. The criticism of this line of thought is
twofold:  The  status  of  implicit  inferences is
very unclear, because inferences are defined as
relations  between  propositions;  and  there  is
evidence  that  implicit  information  processes
are often non-propositional in nature. For ex-
ample, in the case of experts, very often the
epistemic  strategy  in  their  field  is  complex
visual  pattern-matching  without  any  infer-
ences;  with  their  superior  organization  of
knowledge,  for  instance,  a  chess  expert  can
rapidly perceive a promising move, or a med-
ical expert can quickly notice an inconsistency
in  a  suggested  diagnosis.  The  process  of
smoothly using this information mainly relies
on  fine-grained  pattern-discrimination  and
pattern-matching (Gobet 1997) in the relevant
situation,  rather  than  on  drawing  inferences
(which only becomes the case if the expert has
to  consider  problematic  situations).  This  is
supported by observations of  the way people
recall  chess  positions:  When  seeing  a  chess
board  that  contains  a  real,  meaningful  ar-
rangement, chess experts excel as compared to
novices in recalling positions, but perform no
better  for  scrambled,  impossible  positions
(Gobet &  Simon 1996).  This  indicates  that
they  are  able  to  “see”  meaningful  patterns
that a novice cannot see. They may use this
ability in  addition to making inferences,  but
inferences are not so much their basic access
strategy as an additional one.2 If  neither the
strategy of simulation nor the strategy of the-
ory-based inferences is  the standard strategy
upon which our smooth, everyday understand-
2 It is important to note that I leave it open whether we have
to rely on a package of knowledge we are warranted in call -
ing a theory, since I only discuss the strategy of information
processing,  not  the  organization  of  prior  knowledge  in  ex -
perts.
ing  of  others  is  based,  what  form does  epi-
stemic access to others’ mental states take? 
3.3 What about direct perception?
In  recent  years  Gallagher (2008)  has  argued
that our epistemic access to others’ mental phe-
nomena is  essentially  based  on  direct  percep-
tion. The mental states of others are not hid-
den, and need not be inferred on the basis of
perceiving others’ behaviour; rather, behaviour
is an expression of the mental phenomena that,
in  seeing  the  behaviour,  is  also  seen  directly.
What  does  the  claim of  direct  perception  in-
volve? Gallagher explains his main idea with an
analogy: I can directly see my car. It would be
inadequate to claim that I only directly see the
colour, the shape, and the material, and then
have to infer that it is my car. This is also sup-
ported by the fact that, when seeing the car, I
at the same time see its drivability. This view
does  not  deny  that  object-perception  involves
complex  and  partially  hierarchically-organized
brain processes, but it introduces the notion of
“smart”  perception:  If  I  have  learned  the
concept CAR and I am used to driving cars, I
can see a car directly; and in seeing my car I
may also see concomitant affordances such as its
drivability. The same is true in the case of un-
derstanding others: according to Gallagher, by
seeing their face and body posture in a specific
situation, I can directly see that someone fears
an  aggressive  dog.  This  can  be  realized  by
visual pattern-matching without inferences (see
footnote 3 and Newen et al. forthcoming). This
is a convincing comparison, especially as regards
its potential to give a unified account of both
basic  perception  and  what  Gallagher  calls
“smart”  perception.  The  latter  are  cases  in
which it appears plausible to accept that per-
ception can be modulated by conceptual inform-
ation, these usually being described as cases of
cognitive  penetration  (see  Macpherson 2012;
Vetter & Newen 2014).
Let  us illustrate both the basic  and the
smart perception of an emotion. Basic percep-
tion of an emotion takes place when we see fear,
joy, anger,  or sadness in the face of  a person
while  relying  mainly  on  a  single  feature,  or
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small  group of  features,  connected with facial
expression (Ekman et  al. 1972).3 This  can be
done through a bottom-up perceptual  process
that involves almost no top-down influences, es-
pecially if the facial expression is very charac-
teristic  of  an emotion pattern. In the case of
smart perception, the perception of the emotion
is  modulated  by  higher-order  cognitive  pro-
cesses. To show this, we need a case in which
the same facial input leads to a different per-
ception of an emotion as a result of conceptual
input. Such cases have indeed been discovered:
If we first hear a story describing a very unjust
situation that makes us expect the person we
are going to see to be angry, we have a strong
tendency to see a typical “Ekman” fearful face
as an angry face: for example, if I am told that
the relevant person made a reservation at the
restaurant, waited for an hour while many other
people who had come in later were served first,
and that after a further hour was informed that
she  would  have  to  wait  for  at  least  another
hour, then I have a strong expectation of seeing
anger. This has been shown to make us see a
typical fearful face as an angry face (Carroll &
Russell 1996).  Smart perception of an emotion
is  a  cognitively-penetrated  perception  of  an
emotion,  and  it  is  also  important  for  seeing
more complex emotions that do not have the
typical Ekman facial expressions: if I know that
John is jealous of Peter, because he told me so,
and I have seen several episodes of Peter behav-
ing intimately towards John’s  wife Anne,  and
the next day I see another episode of John flirt-
ing with Anne while Peter observes them, I can
directly see the jealousy in Peter’s face. There is
no need for inference-based evaluations. This is
parallel to Gallagher’s case of seeing one’s car:
3 Although  our  basic  perception  mainly  relies  on  certain  central
cues—e.g., wide-open eyes for fear—the fearful face is not recog-
nized only in one central feature of the face. It requires the integ-
ration of several  facial features, and not static ones alone. The
perceiver also benefits from noticing dynamic visual features like
gaze direction: If the gaze is directed away from the perceiver in-
stead of towards her, then this makes the recognition of fear oc-
cur  faster  (see  Adams &  Kleck 2003;  Sander et  al. 2006).  To-
gether with colleagues I have argued elsewhere that emotion re-
cognition is essentially a process of pattern recognition (Newen et
al. forthcoming). This is true for these basic perceptions of emo-
tions. The face is integrated with body posture, since facial ex -
pressions  are  categorized as  expressing a specific  emotion most
rapidly  when they are  paired with emotionally  congruent  body
postures (Meeren et al. 2005; van den Stock et al. 2007).
we may describe both cases as cases  of seeing
as: seeing my car as a car (by knowing which
affordances come with it) and seeing John’s face
as evincing jealousy. I illustrated these cases of
direct  perception  because  I  think  Gallagher
makes an important point when he claims that
the main source of understanding others is dir-
ect perception (whether basic or smart). Never-
theless, there are clear limits to direct percep-
tion as a form of epistemic access.
Although Gallagher has in the past shown
a tendency to overgeneralize the importance of
the role of direct perception (2008), he is well
aware that there remain cases that cannot be
accounted for without going beyond direct per-
ception. This is the case especially concerning
our understanding of  propositional attitudes—
e.g., someone’s desire to take a summer holiday
with his elder brother in western Turkey. Pro-
positional attitudes are normally radically un-
derdetermined by  expressive  elements  such  as
facial expressions, gestures, body postures, etc.,
in a given situation. In general, therefore, com-
plex human cognitive phenomena of this under-
determined type are communicated by linguistic
exchange, or else have to be inferred or simply
guessed  on  the basis  of  available  information.
The latter often happens in situations of non-
transparent communication due to norms in so-
cial situations, or due to the fact that at least
one person wants to hide her beliefs and inten-
tions. Since these situations are also part of our
everyday life, inferential processes remain part
of our everyday understanding of others. Thus,
although direct perception is a very important
epistemic strategy that we may use in cases of
face-based perception of emotion, even “smart”
direct perception is not the basic strategy em-
ployed to understand complex beliefs,  desires,
and intentions of others. The latter require in-
ferential  processes  as  well.  Thus,  we  are  left
with three strategies (simulation, theory-based
inferences, direct perception), where none is a
clearly dominant standard strategy relevant to
all mental phenomena.
But there is at least one further candidate
we  should  take  into  account,  namely  under-
standing though primary interaction (Gallagher
& Hutto 2008). All the epistemic strategies dis-
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cussed so far can apply to situations in which I
am simply observing the other without being in-
volved in any interaction. As we have already
mentioned, Gallagher views this as a radical de-
fect of such accounts; intuitive understanding of
others is part of our everyday life, and this is
especially the case if I am not in a purely obser-
vational  situation but am directly involved in
some kind of interaction. Intuitive understand-
ing may then be characterized just by the fact
that I notice a social act being directed towards
me and so start to interact, such that a stand-
ard social interaction is realized, which may be
non-linguistic  but  may  also  involve  linguistic
communication—e.g.,  friendly  greetings  ex-
changed while arranging ourselves in line at the
office coffee machine. Such a strategy of under-
standing can only be dominant if  the interac-
tion is situated within many conventions, such
that  smooth  understanding  can  take  place
without  theoretical  considerations  about  the
others’  beliefs  and intentions (de Bruin et al.
2012). But is understanding though primary in-
teraction, as it already takes place in neonate
imitation (Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1994), really
the main  or  the standard strategy for  under-
standing others? Again, even if  we grant that
this  is  an  important  strategy  in  basic  under-
standing of others, even in adults—e.g., in min-
imal understanding deployed by smoothly inter-
acting with a stranger who is taking the same
bus—we  need  more  advanced  strategies  to
frame estimations about the ramifications of the
situation—e.g.,  whether  taking this  bus in  an
unknown city, by night, and with such people
on board, is a reasonable risk to take. 
3.4 The multiplicity view
To summarize thus far. We use at least four epi-
stemic strategies to understand others, and we
learn  to  use  these  strategies  on  the  basis  of
evidence of successful application in the past in
relevantly similar situations. We prefer  to use
simulation  strategies  where  we  have  evidence
that  the  other  is  similar  to  us  in  respect  of
many features that are relevant to the situation
of evaluation. We typically use theory-based in-
ferences if we need to account for complex men-
tal phenomena or if an intuitive understanding
is,  for whatever reason, not available.  We use
understanding by primary interaction in cases
in which we are involved in interaction with the
other and only need to understand her or him
to a limited degree, such that acting according
to conventions is sufficient for a smooth interac-
tion. Finally, we normally rely on direct percep-
tion of mental phenomena when we are in an
observational stance towards the other and have
a rich, well-organized body of experience that
allows  us  to  recognize  mental  phenomena  as
patterns. This is rather easy in cases of emotion
recognition, more complex in recognizing inten-
tions,  and almost impossible in  understanding
complex propositional attitudes of others. Only
the  combination  of  all  four  strategies,  in  full
sensitivity  to  the  context  and applied  on  the
basis of our experience in successfully using the
strategies,  makes  us  experts  in  understanding
others. Thus, we have reached a first main con-
clusion concerning strategies of understanding,
this being what I call the multiplicity view:
The  multiplicity  view  =Df There  is  no
standard default strategy of understanding
others,  but  in  everyday  cases  of  under-
standing others we rely on a multiplicity
of  strategies  that  we vary  depending  on
the context and on our prior experiences
(and  which  are  eventually  also  triggered
by explicit training).4
This thesis is also supported by a closer look at
mental  disorder  such  as  Asperger’s  syndrome,
which is a variant of autism (Fiebich &  Colt-
heart under  review).  People  with  Asperger’s
syndrome  lack  an  intuitive  understanding  of
others.  They  are  unable  to  directly  perceive
emotions on the basis of facial expressions, and
they tend to avoid social  interaction (Vogeley
2012). Thus intuitive understanding by primary
interaction or direct perception is not available
for  them.  Since  they  also  tend  to  experience
themselves  as  being  different  (Vogeley 2012),
they  do  not  use  simulation  as  a  strategy:  so
4 This view was worked out in parallel by Anika Fiebich in her PhD
thesis, under my supervision. She applied the thesis in discussing the
case of autism (defended January 2013).
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they are left principally with theory-based infer-
ences  (Kuzmanovic et  al. 2011).  And  this  is
what we can observe: persons who are autistic
try to understand others by asking for theoret-
ical guidance; thus they might ask how long one
is allowed to look into the eyes of another per-
son (Kai Vogeley, personal communication; his
expertise is based on regular treatment of more
than 300 patients). They also learn what people
think in typical situations, but become lost in
new situations. Since we have to deal with new
situations almost every day, autistic people no-
tice  their  tendency  to  get  lost  and  many  of
them avoid social encounters. This special situ-
ation is explained by the fact that in contrast to
the  usual  multiplicity  of  strategies  of  under-
standing, they are left with theory-based infer-
ences alone. People with Down’s syndrome are
in  a  contrary  kind  of  situation:  they  have  a
good  intuitive  understanding  of  others’  emo-
tions,  but,  due  to  typically  very  constrained
cognitive  abilities,  they lack any theory-based
inferences.  In  the  early  years  of  childhood—
where cognitive skills are not so important as in
kindergarten or school—their social life is very
similar  to  the  social  life  of  children  without
Down’s syndrome; but in later life the interde-
pendence  of  social  interaction  with  cognitive
abilities leads to more problems in building an
inclusive social life (Buckley et al. 2002). Thus,
the  normal  multiplicity  of  strategies  may  be
strongly constrained in some conditions of men-
tal  disorders.  Furthermore,  we  can  roughly
cluster direct perception and interaction as the
main  epistemic  access  for  an  intuitive  under-
standing of others, while inference-based under-
standing is based mainly either on a (high-level)
simulation  strategy  or  theory-based  inferences
(including  inferences  from  narratives,  see  be-
low). Since in our everyday life most of what is
going on is intuitive understanding of others, it
is  especially  important  to  highlight  the  relev-
ance of social perception. In what follows, I will
argue that the most important unit of cluster-
ing information about others is neither a facial
unit nor an emotion type (or some other sub-
personal unit), but the whole person—and thus
a primary aspect of epistemic access is our abil-
ity to perceive persons. We perceive persons and
their mental settings mainly by directly perceiv-
ing them, and/or interacting with them. In ad-
dition, we can come to judgments regarding per-
sons by simulating them and/or through infer-
ence-based understanding. 
4 The organization of relevant 
background knowledge about others
We  can  now  address  the  second  independent
question  concerning  understanding  others:  How
do  we  organize  the  information  about  other
people that we already have? This question pre-
supposes that in standard cases of understanding
others we are not in a situation in which we are
bereft  of  relevant background knowledge.  Quite
the contrary: most of the time, we interact with
people about whom we have a lot of background
knowledge—family  members,  colleagues,  friends,
etc. Furthermore, we have background knowledge
about  the  general  needs  of  human beings,  the
special needs of students, homeless people, etc. It
seems clear that we are relying on this type of
knowledge in an essential way when we under-
stand others. There may be very short period as a
newborn baby when we start from scratch, armed
only  with  certain  inborn  minimal  mechanisms
such as neonate imitation. Even the social smile
developed with two months is dependent on ex-
ternal stimulation and learning processes, and ba-
bies very quickly start to react selectively towards
familiar and foreign individuals. They also expect
a typical behavioural interactive pattern from the
caregiver. If  a mother stops reacting intuitively
through normal facial  expressions and gestures,
and instead reacts with a “still face”, then the
baby  quickly  starts  to  cry  (Bertin &  Striano
2006;  Nagy 2008). The baby is irritated by the
unexpected pattern of reaction. How, then, are all
these different types of background information
about the other organized and used in social un-
derstanding?
4.1 Are we organizing our prior 
knowledge in folk-psychological 
theories?
The question of whether we are organizing our
knowledge according to folk-psychological theor-
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ies has received a number of different answers.
According to TT, this is exactly what happens.
In understanding others we rely on folk-psycho-
logical rules such as: “If she desires an ice-cream
and she believes that she can get one with her
money at the cafeteria, then she will go to the
cafeteria”. No doubt folk-psychological rules, or-
ganized according to a belief–desire psychology,
are an important instrument for understanding
others; but they are by no means the only one.
Often it is sufficient to know the conventions in
a society to understand what someone is doing
and will do next, e.g., if someone is in Japan
and he enters a restaurant, he will first take off
his  shoes,  then take a seat,  and then will  be
asked to order.  So, seeing someone entering a
restaurant  who looks  like  a guest  (and not  a
waiter)  allows us to expect  a  specific  conven-
tionally-regulated sequence of behaviour. If one
has a liberal notion of folk-psychological theory,
then we may add such behavioural conventions
into that theory. But even then the question re-
mains whether our understanding of others al-
ways relies  on knowledge organized as a folk-
psychological theory. A counterexample can be
proposed by reference to cases of basic intuitive
understanding:  e.g.,  the  still-face  reaction  by
the caregiver, instead of a typical smiling facial
expression  and  gestural  response,  makes  the
baby start to cry (as we saw above). There is
thus an intuitive recognition of basic emotions
like fear, anger, happiness, or sadness. This may
rely on inborn emotion recognition mechanisms,
or mechanisms learned very early, which may be
evolutionarily anchored, since recognizing such
basic emotions is essential for survival (Griffiths
1997;  Panksepp 2005). There are two ways in
which the counterexample might be blocked: (i)
It could be maintained that some folk-psycholo-
gical  theories  are  inborn  (Baron-Cohen 1995)
and that intuitive understanding such as face-
based recognition of emotion already involves a
theoretical package. The problem with this line
of  reasoning  is  that  the  notion  of  theory,
stretched that far, starts to look very implaus-
ible. A theory is constituted by a minimal pack-
age of systematically interconnected beliefs; and
even if a belief is understood in a liberal way
such that it does not presuppose linguistic rep-
resentations,  it  remains  highly  questionable
whether basic cases of faced-based recognition
can be characterized as a systematically inter-
connected set of beliefs. The standard descrip-
tions of face-based recognition of emotion (e.g.,
Goldman 2006) on a neural level highlight the
relevance  of  mirror  neuron  mechanisms  and
characterize  the  underlying  mechanism  as  a
rather basic and partially independent pattern-
recognition process, and thus as not forming a
theory. A defect in recognizing disgust does not
automatically  lead  to  a  defect  in  recognizing
other basic emotions like happiness or sadness
(Calder et  al. 2000).  (ii)  A  more  promising
move is to claim that the folk-psychological the-
ory is learned (Gopnik 1993). This view is com-
patible  with  some  basic  processes  of  under-
standing which do not yet form a theory, but
are developed into one as they are integrated
step  by  step  into  a  systematically-organized
body of knowledge. This is a plausible and to
some extent empirically grounded view (Gopnik
& Meltzoff 1997; Newen & Vogeley 2003).5 One
shortcoming of  this  view,  however,  is  that its
proponents  tend  to  appeal  to  examples  that
have  a  strong  focus  on  general  folk-psycholo-
gical rules, such as: “All humans need to drink,
thus if someone picks up a glass in the kitchen,
he intends to pour into it some liquid to drink”.
This  neglects  a  very  important  phenomenon,
namely that we mostly interact not with com-
plete  strangers  but  with  persons  we  know at
least partly and often very well. For example, if
Michael observes his son in the kitchen grasping
a glass he does not appeal to the folk-psycholo-
gical rule at all, since he knows that his son—
despite his education—still only drinks from a
bottle when at home, and that if he takes up a
5 Gopnik and Meltzoff insist that the basic registration of objects—
e.g., their being sensitive to object permanence, as well as the basic
registration of agents rooted in their being able to distinguish inan-
imate objects and living beings—which babies develop very early on,
shows that they already have an initial theory of objects and agents.
They argue that the already innate “structures are rich enough and
abstract enough to merit the name of theories themselves” (Gopnik
& Meltzoff 1997, p. 82). But it is questionable whether the notion of
theory really has any fruitful role here, because, for example, explan-
ations and predictions of the behaviour of a baby when seeing an ob-
ject  are  extremely  constrained.  The  developmental  story  told  by
Gopnik and Meltzoff is of course very plausible and at some point
turns into a theory, because the transformation of the representation
in the context of new cognitive abilities comes with a rich and sys-
tematic package of explanations and predictions. 
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glass it is just because he wants to use it for
practising magic tricks. This indicates that all
the  theories  canvassed  thus  far  have  a  blind
spot: so far it seems simply to have been neg-
lected that we rely extensively on knowledge of
properties of individuals, which is organized as
belonging  to  one  specific  individual  (the  son,
the partner etc.) or to a group (students, man-
agers, etc.). The general worry concerning the
organization  of  this  knowledge,  according  to
TT, can also be expressed as follows: How are
we able to apply a general theory of typically
human features in a specific social situation? If
we  want  to  integrate  our  prior  background
knowledge of  persons as individuals  or as be-
longing to a group, e.g., to a profession, then we
can characterize the organization of this know-
ledge as  person models. Person models of indi-
viduals and groups are by far the most import-
ant source of understanding others, I will argue,
and since they involve specific knowledge, they
are the natural candidate for enabling adequate
deployment of  more  general  knowledge of  hu-
man psychology in concrete everyday situations.
It remains to be discussed, then, whether per-
son models have the status of a folk-psycholo-
gical theory or not. To adumbrate my line of ar-
gument: no doubt some elaborate person models
are systematically-interconnected sets of beliefs,
but not all of them have to be, because some
person models only involve very sparse and ba-
sic properties that are not highly interconnec-
ted.
4.2 Do we organize our prior knowledge 
in narratives? 
As we saw earlier, one recent account of under-
standing others, proposed by Dan Hutto (2008),
holds  that  understanding  others  mainly  relies
on telling stories and using this knowledge to
understand individuals.  The core  claim of  his
NPH (Narrative Practice Hypothesis) is 
[…]  that  direct  encounters  with  stories
about persons who act for reasons—those
supplied  in  interactive  contexts  by  re-
sponsive  caregivers—is  the  normal  route
through  which  children  become  familiar
with both (1) the basic structure of folk
psychology  and  (2)  the  norm-governed
possibilities  for  wielding  it  in  practice,
thus learning both how and when to use
it. (Hutto 2008, preface, p. x) 
One focus of his theory is not so much how the
prior background knowledge of others is organ-
ized, but rather how children are able to acquire
it. His developmental claim is that the central
route  for  learning  relevant  background  know-
ledge  is  listening  to  stories  about  persons.  I
grant that this is an important additional route
of epistemic access to relevant knowledge about
others; but it is already an advanced method,
not normally used before the second year of life.
Furthermore, in such cases the focus is not epi-
stemic access to knowledge used to understand
the other in the situation (i.e., when listening to
the storyteller),  but rather to gain new back-
ground knowledge with an eye to future under-
standing of others. In a follow-up paper written
together  with  Gallagher  (Gallagher &  Hutto
2008), Hutto and Gallagher enrich their views
about epistemic access through appeal to direct
perception and interaction (see above) in addi-
tion to learning by narratives. It is important to
note the difference between epistemic access to
information that allows me to understand the
other in the actual situation (see section 3) and
epistemic access to background knowledge relev-
ant  for  future  usage.  Thus,  by  granting  that
narratives  are  an  additional  instrument  for
learning about important properties of persons,
I can enrich my multiplicity claim as character-
ized above. In integrating this idea, one should
also generalize it: we not only learn important
background information that helps us to under-
stand others  by listening to stories  told by a
caregiver, but also by reading stories, especially
novels.
Let us now briefly discuss the NPH con-
sidered as a claim about the organization of our
background knowledge. If I have elaborate and
explicit knowledge of a person, I may have ac-
quired it by listening to or reading a story, and
I may tell a story if someone asks me about this
person. But, as the interaction view highlights,
sometimes my knowledge may be anchored in
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the  interaction,  yet  still  be  non-linguistically
represented, and only activated in similar inter-
active situations. Our rich non-linguistic know-
ledge about other human beings, which we ac-
quire  when  directly  perceiving  them  (tone  of
voice, what they look like) or interacting with
them, or when realizing a joint action, etc., are
often  not  linguistically  coded  and  thus  not
memorized as a linguistic story. If we widen the
notion of a story such that it includes any se-
quence  of  memorized events,  we lose  track of
any interesting notion of “story”. In fact, we are
instead going in  the direction that I propose,
i.e., that we organize our prior knowledge about
others  through  unifying  it  in  person  models.
Some such models may include properties of a
person  that  are  connected  as  or  with  stories,
but the core of a person model is a unity of fea-
tures of a person that are grouped together as
belonging to one individual or to a group, where
the features may be as primitive as the tone of
voice of  a person, and have no connection to
any story, even in a wide sense.
Although our prior knowledge about oth-
ers is the main component of our understanding
of others in a specific situation, most of the the-
ories canvassed above did not present any clear
view on how this knowledge is organized.6 We
found only two suggestions: relevant prior know-
ledge is organized either as a folk-psychological
theory or as a narrative. Neither proposal covers
all  relevant cases:  neither accounts for the in-
nate or very-early-learned (nontheoretical) basic
background knowledge that enables us to effect
smooth interaction and allows us to rely on a
basic  intuitive  understanding  of  others.  And,
furthermore, as I argue in the following, there is
an alternative view, the person model  theory,
which is able to integrate the plausible aspects
of these two suggestions, and additionally allows
us to explain a variety of phenomena that the
alternative views did not or cannot take into ac-
count—especially the integration of features of
6 This includes, e.g., the ST, which mainly offers a claim about
how we use our knowledge to understand others, and that the
main  source of this knowledge—in addition to situational  in -
put—is one’s own experience. But a representative of ST can
easily  grant  that  relevant  prior  knowledge  is  organized  in  a
folk-psychological theory. She only insists that the strategy of
application  of  this  knowledge  in  a  situation  is  a  simulation
process.
other human beings that allow us to realize an
intuitive understanding of them. 
5 The person model theory
Before  expounding  the  new  account,  let  me
highlight two main criteria of adequacy for any
plausible candidate theory and some open ques-
tions.  (i)  The  theory  should  account  for  two
levels  of  understanding  others  from  a  phe-
nomenological perspective, namely intuitive un-
derstanding and inference-based understanding.
This  was  first  clearly  discussed  by  Gallagher
(2001),  while  Goldman (2006)  described  it  in
his distinction between low-level and high-level
mindreading. What, we may then ask, would be
an  adequate  way  of  establishing  this  distinc-
tion?  (ii)  We  learned  from  Gallagher (2005)
that we should distinguish understanding others
by observation from understanding by interac-
tion.
There are also a number of open research
questions that  can potentially be answered in
developing the alternative account: (a) What is
the relation between understanding oneself and
understanding others? Here the ST claims that
understanding oneself is the basis for all under-
standing  of  others,  while  TT is  neutral;  Car-
ruthers, for example, has famously argued that
understanding others is the source of our self-
understanding (2009). (b) What is the relation
between understanding persons and understand-
ing objects or situations? (c) How can we best
account for the difference between understand-
ing a well-known person, on the one hand, and
a complete stranger, on the other? 
The new alternative theory, which prom-
ises  to deal with these open questions,  is  the
person model theory. The central claim of this
theory is that we organize our prior knowledge
that  is  used  to  understand  others  into  some-
thing we can call person models, and that ac-
counting for our way of using person models is
the most informative factor when analyzing our
everyday  understanding  of  others.  A  person
model7 is a unity of properties or features that
7 An important question which I cannot discuss in this paper is the
question of the development of person model and the limits of ap-
plication. Some very sketchy remarks may be of help here for urgent
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we represent  in  memory  as  belonging  to  one
person or a group (resp. type) of persons. To
account for the difference between two types of
understanding others (intuitive versus inference-
based understanding), I suggest that there are
two types of person models in use: implicit per-
son  models,8 which  we  shall  call  person
schemata; and explicit person models, which we
shall call person images. Very early in life we
develop person schemata: a person schema is an
implicit person model and can typically be de-
scribed as a unity of sensory-motor abilities and
basic mental phenomena9 realized by basic rep-
resentations and associated with one human be-
ing (or a group of humans), where the schema
typically functions without any explicit consid-
erations and is activated when directly seeing or
interacting  with  another  person.  A  person
questions: Concerning the development I suggest that person model
enfolds gradually from an early model of living agents which is based
on sensitivity for clusters of features indicating animacy and agency.
This “agent models” enfold into person models which are systematic-
ally  enriched  by  the  features  I  describe  as  belonging  to  person
schemata and person images. Furthermore, a creation of a person
model (which is a unity of information clustered together) does not
presuppose a concept of a person. Person models are developed in
fact  if  some  typical  features  of  adult  healthy  human  beings  are
clustered to model an individual or a group of entities which are rel-
evantly similar to adult healthy human beings. Typical core features
are e.g., 1. being an agent, 2. being a sentient being, 3. having some
minimal control of action. We use person models to understand ba-
bies and pets since we usually perceive them as having a minimal
amount of core features.
8 I am only presupposing a minimal consensus on using the distinction
of implicit versus explicit. It indicates a (gradual) difference in epi-
stemic access such that paradigmatic cases of explicit contents are
easily accessible (by the subject’s experience, memory, thinking, ima-
gining etc.) while paradigmatic cases of implicit contents are very
difficult to access by the subject while they nevertheless influence the
subject’s  cognition and behaviour.  Intuitively,  explicit  content  are
correlated with our intuitive understanding of conscious accessibility,
but since the latter is scientifically pretty unclear, I do not want to
ground the implicit/explicit distinction on the difference between be-
ing or not being consciously accessible.
9 Mental  phenomena have different ontological  types:  states,  events,
processes, and dispositions. So not only are stable mental phenomena
included but so are situational  experiences (like tokens of percep-
tions, emotions, attitudes, etc.).
schema is thus the unity of implicitly-available
information about a person that is thus not eas-
ily accessible in terms of being reportable but is
nevertheless  used  in  a  specific  situation.  In
other words, a person schema is the basic unit
that enables a practical knowledge (a knowledge
how) for  dealing  with  another  human  being
while this ability relies mainly upon social per-
ception and interaction. Person schemata can be
developed step by step into  person images.  A
person image is a unity of explicitly represented
and typically consciously available mental and
physical phenomena related to a human being
(or a group of people). Thus, a person image is
the unity of rather easily and explicitly avail-
able information about a person, including the
person’s mental setting. Both person schemata
and person images can be developed for an indi-
vidual, e.g., one’s mother, brother, best friend,
etc., as well as for groups of people, e.g., med-
ical  doctors,  homeless  people,  managers,  etc.
Furthermore,  person  models  are  created  for
other people but also for oneself.10 In the case of
modelling oneself we can speak of a self-model
that we develop implicitly as a self-schema and
explicitly as a self-image. Thus, we have the fol-
lowing varieties of person models (see Table 1).
Person  models  are  characterized  here  as
memorized units of person features, ignoring the
difference  between  long-term  or  short-term
memorization.11 Person models are distinguished
10 The distinction between person schema and person image is based on
Shaun Gallagher’s distinction between body schema and body image.
Establishing a  person schema of my own body amounts to  Galla-
gher’s body schema, while a person image of my own body is similar
to what he introduces as body image (2005, p. 24).
11 In a more detailed explication of the theory, it would indeed be use-
ful to distinguish short-term person models (only stored in working
memory)  and  long-term  person  models  (stored  in  a  long-term
memory). In addition, other established distinctions in memory can
be used to characterize the content of person models, such as proced-
ural and declarative contents as well as episodic and semantic con-
tents. I will, however, ignore these distinctions in this paper. 
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from the result of understanding in a situation,
which may be either a person impression that
mainly relies on person schemata, or a person
judgment that mainly relies on person images.
Let me illustrate one clear  virtue of  adopting
the distinction between person schema and per-
son image by reference to the fact that it can
account for the difference between intuitive un-
derstanding and inference-based understanding
of others.
5.1 Person schemata
In detail,  then, what are person schemata? A
person schema is an intuitively formed, implicit
model of a person; it is a memorized unity of
characteristic features of a person including fa-
cial features and expression, voice, moving pat-
tern, body posture, gestures, and other perceiv-
able features of a person. The function of clus-
tering these features is to allow us to evaluate a
person very quickly in a situation according to
evolutionarily-important aspects: is a person fa-
miliar,  dangerous,  aggressive,  helpful,  or  at-
tractive? The evaluation is either expressed in a
type of interaction, or it can simply be memor-
ized in an implicit unitary structure for future
retrieval, including recognizing the person and
activating the former evaluation (Reddy 2008).
Our main access  to others  in everyday life  is
through perceiving a person and forming an im-
pression  (see  the  review  published  as  a  book
chapter by Macrae & Quadflieg 2010). To form
a person  impression,  (i)  we  typically  pick  up
these basic features by means of a quick visual
evaluation, even when seeing a person for the
first time, where (ii) most features are directly
associated  with  socially-relevant  information,
and (iii) they are clustered at the level of per-
ceiving  the  whole  person.  Let  me  offer  some
support for all three characteristics of the pro-
cess of forming a person impression in a situ-
ation that is memorized as a person schema:
(i)  Quick evaluation even with parsimoni-
ous information: Evaluations of threat (which is
of strong evolutionary relevance) can be made
on the basis of exposure to an unfamiliar face
lasting as little as  39 milliseconds (Bar et al.
2006).  If  the  exposure  to  the  unfamiliar  face
lasts  about  100  milliseconds,  we  are  able  to
evaluate  likeability,  trustworthiness,  compet-
ence, and aggressiveness with subjective reliabil-
ity levels that are similar to those generated un-
der  longer  viewing  times  (Willis &  Todorov
2006).12 
(ii)  Most features are associated with so-
cially relevant information: looking into the face
is a very rich source of information about a per-
son.  Between 3 and 7 months of  age,  infants
learn to recognize the face of the mother and to
distinguish it from the faces of strangers, and
they  start  to  categorize  people  according  to
emotional  expression  and  sex  (Nelson 2001).
One important source of information that chil-
dren use from 4 months onwards is the gaze-dir-
ection of a person, it having been shown that
they can distinguish a direct from an averted
gaze (Vecera & Johnson 1995). From 9 months
onwards, infants learn to register the joint at-
tention of the infant and an adult as directed
towards an object (Cleveland & Striano 2007).
Thus, on the basis of gaze-interaction they eval-
uate whether joint attention towards an object
has been established or not, and learn to direct
the  attention  of  the  other  if  necessary  (To-
masello 1999).  Between the ages of  9  and 18
months, children start to use gaze-information
to register the  goal of the action of the other
human:  they  attend  immediately  to  the  eyes
when the intentions of an actor are ambiguous
(Phillips et al. 1992).
Let me now pick out some results based on
studies  of  adults  that  illustrate  the  informa-
tional value of single cues. To start with facial
expression:  in  emotion  recognition,  highly  in-
12 The time course can be observed in ERP studies. These studies all
support claims about the early information processing of faces, al-
though there is an ongoing debate about how best to interpret the
results. The main observations are enhanced responsiveness to faces
relative to a variety of other objects with peaks at approximately 100
milliseconds (Herrmann et al. 2005;  Liu et al. 2002;  Pegna et al.
2004), 170 milliseconds (Bentin et al. 1996; Eimer & McCarthy 1999;
Itier & Taylor 2004), and 250 milliseconds (Bentin & Deouell 2000;
Schweinberger et al. 2004) after stimulus onset. (For review see Mac-
rae & Quadflieg 2010). Whole bodies (without faces) are evaluated
with a delay of 20 milliseconds compared to the evaluation of faces
(Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz 2005). Concerning faces with emotional
expressions, the following rather stable result is reported: there is a
frontocentral positivity as early as 120 milliseconds after stimulus on-
set and a later more broadly distributed positivity beyond 250 milli-
seconds; both are modulated by emotional facial expressions (Eimer
&  Holmes 2002;  Holmes et al. 2003;  Vuilleumier &  Pourtois 2007;
Williams et al. 2006).
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formative features include knitted eyebrows for
sadness, a smile for happiness, and a frown for
anger (Ekman 1972,  1999). To prevent this re-
mark giving the wrong impression, I here high-
light some individual features and will argue in
the next step that they are part of an integ-
rated view at the level of persons. Salient biolo-
gical visual markers allow us to easily identify
the “big three” categories in person perception
(Brewer 1988; Fiske & Neuberg 1990), i.e., sex,
race, and age. In the same way, we can illus-
trate highly informative single features such as
body posture: if the other is bending her head
in  a  communicative  context,  this  is  uncon-
sciously registered as signalling sympathy (Frey
1999).13 One important data source here is bio-
logical motion-detection as investigated by point
light  studies.  If  a  person  has  lights  on  her
hands, feet, and ankles, and some other signific-
ant  parts  of  her  body,  we can  videotape  her
bodily  movement  in  the  dark.  Such  artificial
pure biological movement information allows us
to register social features, e.g., we can recognize
emotions (Ambady &  Rosenthal 1992) and at-
tribute  personality  features  (Heberlein et  al.
2004) on the basis of seeing dynamic movements
alone. Furthermore, there is evidence that social
information can be taken from the combination
of gesture and body posture alone. In an inter-
cultural study (Bente et al. 2010), an interac-
tion  between  an  employer  and  an  employee
(played by two students of one type of culture)
was filmed for a short period. Then the film was
edited to show only gesture and body posture.
This was realized by showing idealized wooden
puppets, representing the real interaction while
abstracting  from  facial  information,  speech,
clothing etc. The question to be addressed was,
what we can read from seeing the body postures
and gestures. The interactions were filmed with
students from UAE (United Arabic Emirates),
Germany, and the United States; and the test
subjects were also drawn from all three coun-
tries.  With  this  film,  people  could  determine
whether the people in the scene were nervous or
not, as well as the dominance relation, i.e., they
13 We leave the question open as to what extent person schemata are
constituted by innate or by learned dispositions. The examples men-
tioned above indicate that they involve properties of both kinds.
could see who was the boss. This is an intercul-
turally-shared social understanding of otherwise
culturally  variable  cues  of  body  posture  and
gesture (the US students moved a lot while the
UAE students moved rarely). They furthermore
could perceive the level of friendliness in the in-
teraction,  although the study showed that we
are good at this only in assessing our own cul-
ture.14 Furthermore, there are many more com-
plex  culturally-dependent  visual  features  that
(according to other studies) we use for evaluat-
ing  the  other—e.g.,  physical  attractiveness,
where  attractive  people  are  evaluated  as  pos-
sessing more desirable characteristics than their
less attractive counterparts, a phenomenon that
has been labelled the  beauty-is-good stereotype
(Dion et  al. 1972;  Eagly et  al. 1991).  These
kinds  of  stereotypes  are  especially  connected
with  racial  classifications:  African–Americans
are stereotypically assumed to be lazy, criminal,
and uneducated, but also musical and athletic
(Devine & Elliot 1995), whereas Asian–Americ-
ans are considered to be intelligent, industrious,
conservative,  and shy (Lin et  al. 2005).  Most
observers  in  our  culture  assume  that  people
with stylish hair and extravagant clothing are
highly extrovert (Borkenau & Liebler 1992). We
live  with  a  lot  of  these  deeply  culturally-
anchored  stereotypes,  and  they  are  often  ap-
plied without the perceivers’ intention or con-
scious  awareness  (Macrae &  Bodenhausen
2000). This last point relates to the third aspect
of person schemata. Person schemata are unities
of characteristic features integrated at the level
of persons. All these singular features are integ-
rated into person models that enable us to de-
velop detailed and extensive expectations of be-
haviour.
(iii)  Integration of  characteristic  features
at the level of perceiving the whole person: Al-
though  I  have  presented  evidence  that  some
single features are very salient for transferring
social information, there is also much evidence
that these features are normally combined with
a variety of others to form an integrated impres-
14 Interestingly,  Germans  could  perceive  the  friendliness  of  stu-
dents from the US and UAE partially (as well as the other way
around), while students from UAE and USA could not read the
level of friendliness from the other culture at all  (Bente et al.
2010).
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sion of a person that I call a person schema. We
have seen evidence for the key role of gaze de-
tection in registering another person’s direction
of attention (see ii). But there is further evid-
ence that gaze alone is not the critical source of
information; we actually seem to rely on an in-
tegrated evaluation on the basis  of  perceiving
gaze, head, and body position (Frischen et al.
2007). The same holds for evaluation of the ba-
sic features sex, race,  and age. Although isol-
ated facial  features  are often sufficient  to de-
termine a person’s sex, research has indicated
that sex categorization is based on the integra-
tion of several features (Baudoin & Humphreys
2006; Bruce et al. 1993; Brown & Perrett 1993;
Roberts &  Bruce 1988;  Schyns et  al. 2002).
Concerning  face,  the  best  available  theory  of
face  recognition seems to be Haxby’s  account
(Haxby et al. 2000), according to which there
are two distinguishable processes, one leading to
face identification by focussing more on invari-
ant core features, and the other leading to regis-
tering  facial  expression  by  relying  on  varying
features.  Furthermore,  there  is  evidence  that
there are two different neural circuits for face
perception and body perception (see the review
by  Macrae &  Quadflieg 2010), both playing a
core  role  in  registering  face  or  body identity,
and playing an extended role in registering face
or body expression in a given situation. And the
integration  processes  are  not  limited  to  this
level (Martin &  Macrae 2007). Since we know
that  information  about  facial  and bodily  fea-
tures  is  integrated,  e.g.,  in  the  evaluation  of
emotional expression, we can therefore charac-
terize  a  sequence  of  integration  processes  as
leading finally to a person impression in a situ-
ation, which may be stored as a person schema
in memory.
5.2 A model of forming a person schema
How  can  we  best  describe  this  process  of
forming  a  person  schema?  In  general  terms,
the same complex process takes place in the
case of perceiving a person and forming a per-
son  impression  in  a  given  situation  as  takes
place when we perceive an object. I describe
the process according to the model of object
perception  developed  by  Ernst &  Bülthoff
(2004),  and  I  have  already  shown  in  detail
that  it  can  do  justice  to  our  recognition  of
emotions  (Newen et  al. forthcoming).  The
overall process comprises bottom-up processes
starting  with  basic  visual  features  that  are
modulated  either  by  feature  combination  (if
two features provide complementary informa-
tion), or by feature integration. The latter can
be modelled as a Bayesian weighting process
that leads to the most probable intermediate
estimate given the input. Further integration
processes  then  lead  from the  most  probable
estimate to a stable  percept  of  an object  in
the case of object perception, and to a stable
person impression in the case of  person per-
ception.  This  model  explicitly  accounts  not
only for bottom-up but also for top-down pro-
cesses, in the form of so-called cognitive pen-
etration. I have sketched a plausible but in no
way complete model of the formation of a per-
son  impression  (see  figure  below).  According
to the evidence I have presented so far, it is
plausible to suggest that at the level of inter-
mediate estimates in the process of forming an
impression of a person, we find (a) an estima-
tion of a core person identity, (b) an estimate
of  situational  emotions,  intentions,  and  ac-
tions,  as  well  as  (c)  an  estimation  of  social
status, person abilities, and individual person-
ality traits. An important step in the model is
the association of visual features with socially-
anchored stereotypes (see above) which allows
us to develop rich intermediate estimates, e.g.,
of  the  other’s  emotional  situation,  social
status, etc. 
Numerous  lines  of  research  (Albright,
Kenny,  &  Malloy,  1988;  Ambady &
Rosenthal,  1992;  Behling &  Williams,
1991;  Borkenau &  Liebler,  1992;  Kenny,
Horner,  Kashy, &  Chu,  1992;  Norman &
Goldberg,  1966;  Secord,  Dukes, &  Bevan,
1954)  have  provided  compelling  evidence
that  trait  evaluations  are  readily  drawn
from a person’s  physiognomy (i.e.,  facial
features), outer appearance (i.e., clothing),
or demeanor (i.e., posture, walking, style).
(Macrae & Quadflieg 2010, p. 433)
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Finally, I highlight that the top-down processes
are able to interfere in this process of combina-
tion and integration very early in the visual in-
formation  processes:  for  example,  it  has  been
shown that the activation of a race concept on
the basis of the form of a face (African versus
European face format) changes the perception
of colour in the face, while colour is known to
be  represented  in  V4  as  part  of  early  visual
brain processes. The same hue of colour is seen
as more dark in the African face than in the
European face (Levin & Banaji 2006). Thus we
have to admit that the process of feature-com-
bination and integration is highly dynamic, in-
volving  simultaneous  activation  of  features
rooted in bottom-up and top-down processes, fi-
nally  reaching  the  most  probable  and usually
stable  person  impression.  The dynamic  is  de-
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Figure 1: A model of the dynamics of bottom-up and top-down processes leading to a stable person impression by re -
lying on person images and/or person schemata
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scribed in detail for the case of object percep-
tion in Vetter & Newen (2014); it is postulated
for person categorization in  Macrae &  Martin
(2007), and analysed according to the levels of
processing that lead to person construal in Free-
man & Ambady (2011). Figure 1 is a sketch of
the formation of a person impression according
to my account.
A person schema emerges as the result of
direct perception of a person, where this may be
either basic or relatively smart perception; yet
it usually remains implicit, and is not amenable
to linguistic description. A typical example of
person schema based on basic perception is the
everyday  experience  of  seeing  a  person  only
briefly in a single situation, whereupon it is dif-
ficult for us to describe the person—particularly
her face. While we can often easily recognize the
person, it may take hours with a professional to
end  up  with  an  adequate  “identikit”  picture
such  as  those  produced  at  police  stations.  A
person schema based on smart perception might
be, for instance, a person schema that includes
a lot of top-down activation—for example, while
on campus,  perhaps I see a person of  typical
student age dressed like a law student, and thus
activate the “rich person” schema that  is  the
basis for my everyday smooth interaction with
law students,  and which  differs  (despite  over-
laps)  from my person  schema for  students  in
natural sciences. If we not only develop implicit
practical  knowledge  regarding  our  use  of  the
person  impression  (independent  from its  rich-
ness), but also develop explicit  knowledge per-
taining to the relevant person information, or at
least develop easy explicit access to it, then we
go beyond a person schema. We can character-
ize this new unified information as a person im-
age.
5.3 Person images
In detail, then, what is a person image? A per-
son image is a unity of relatively easily and ex-
plicitly available information about a person, in-
cluding her mind-set. On the basis of typically
implicit person schemata, young children learn
to  develop  explicit  person  images.  These  are
models of individual subjects or groups. In the
case  of  individual  subjects,  they  may  include
names, descriptions, stories, whole biographies,
and visual images highlighting both mental and
physical dispositions as well as episodes. Person
images are essentially developed not only by ob-
servation but also  by telling,  exchanging,  and
creating stories (or “narratives”).15 Person im-
ages presuppose the capacity to explicitly dis-
tinguish the representation of  my own mental
and  physical  phenomena  from the  representa-
tion of someone else’s mental and physical phe-
nomena. This ability develops gradually, reach-
ing a major and important stage when children
acquire  the  so-called  explicit  theory-of-mind
ability (operationalized by the false-belief task,
see  Wimmer &  Perner 1983).16 Then they are
able  to  construct  explicit  person  images  by
characterizing a person such that they attribute
a biography to an individual.  There is  strong
folk-psychological evidence that we have explicit
person models of the people we deal with ex-
tensively,  e.g.,  family  members,  and  people
about whom we tend to have a lot of explicit
knowledge. The same is true for relevant groups
of persons we deal with often. Even in profes-
sional contexts this leads to judgments that can
be  inadequate:  the  apparent  association
between wearing revealing clothes and immod-
esty and promiscuity has been shown to cause
not only laypeople but also police officers and
judges to hold victims of rape to be responsible
for their having been assaulted (Lennon et al.
1999). An essential part of becoming an adult is
learning to interact socially with other humans,
by developing sophisticated and explicit person
images of the groups of professions we have to
come to any sort of arrangement with. We often
have  explicit  beliefs  about  medical  doctors,
managers, secretaries, craftspeople, etc., and we
try to deploy these beliefs  to deal with these
people in a smooth and efficient way. When we
15 This is the aspect of the narrative approach to understanding other
minds, mentioned above (e.g.,  Hutto 2008). But narratives are only
one method of establishing a person model. Representatives of a pure
narrative approach underestimate the importance of other sources,
such as perceptions, feelings, interactions, etc., which often do not in-
volve narratives.
16 There  is  a long and not fully  understood process  of  development
from implicit  false  belief  sensitivity  to  explicit  false  belief  under-
standing (de Bruin & Newen 2012a; 2012b). Person images actually
presuppose an explicit representation of false beliefs. 
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have stored a person image in memory, and are
placed in a new situation in which we see and
recognize the person, there is evidence that we
immediately  activate  the  biographical  know-
ledge we have available. For example, when test
persons were asked to judge the traits of target
individuals from photographs, the test persons’
responses  continue  to  be  influenced  by  what
they have explicitly learned about the people in
question  (Uleman et  al. 2005).  A  recent
neuroimaging study (Hassabis et al. 2013) indic-
ated that when test persons were asked to pre-
dict the behaviour of persons, they essentially
relied on prior knowledge of personality traits,
which in this particular study were implemented
in two ways, namely as agreeableness (the tend-
ency  toward  altruism,  cooperation,  and  the
valuing  of  harmony  in  interpersonal  relation-
ships as opposed to antisocial and exploitative
behaviours) and as extroversion (in contrast to
introversion). The test person became acquain-
ted  with  four  types  of  personalities  that  had
been constructed from combinations of high and
low versions of agreeableness, on the one hand,
and high and low versions of  extroversion, on
the other. In the test situation they had to pre-
dict the behaviour of four specific persons who
were  exemplars  of  the  four  personality  types.
The authors report that the predictions of beha-
viour  were  mainly based on personality  traits
and that the latter also had rather clear neural
correlates: by using functional magnetic reson-
ance imaging (fMRI) the authors showed that
there is a neural correlate for recognizing (and
imagining)  high  agreeableness  (in  contrast  to
low), namely in the left LTC (lateral temporal
cortex)  and  dorsal  mPFC  (medial  prefrontal
cortex), as well as for recognizing (and imagin-
ing)  high  extroversion  (in  contrast  to  low),
namely in the pCC (posterior cingulate cortex);
in addition the recognition (and imagination) of
one of the four personality types was correlated
with  four  distinctive  patterns  in  the  anterior
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). In line with
my proposal,  the  authors  of  the  fMRI  study
write:  “Different  patterns  of  activation in  the
anterior  mPFC  could  reliably  distinguish
between  the  different  people  whose  behavior
was being imagined. It is hypothesized that this
region is responsible for assembling and updat-
ing personality models” (Hassabis et al. 2013).
Since the study was based on explicit evaluation
of personality features or types, I take this to
support  the  existence  of  person  images.  Yet
even if  the reader  accepts  the  idea  of  person
models, she may be sceptical about whether we
need to distinguish person schemata and person
images.
5.4 Why should we distinguish person 
schemata and person images?
A very convincing case that forces us to make a
distinction between person schemata and person
images  comes  from taking  a  closer  look  at  a
typical  patient  suffering  from  Capgras  syn-
drome,  a  misidentification  syndrome.  Sufferers
have  the  delusional  belief  that  one  of  their
closest  relatives,  e.g.,  their  wife,  has been re-
placed by an impostor. Such a patient typically
says things like “this person looks exactly like
my wife, she even speaks and behaves like my
wife and she expresses her typical desires but
she is not my wife” (Davies et al. 2001); thus,
one aspect of this mental disorder is the obser-
vation that all the features explicitly believed to
be possessed by the wife are correctly attrib-
uted. We can account for this by asserting that
the patient has an intact person image of his
wife. Nevertheless, the usual person identifica-
tion has gone wrong. According to a standard
analysis, what is lacking in the case of the Cap-
gras patient is a feeling of familiarity that nor-
mally comes with perceiving a well-known per-
son. How can we account for this in the new
framework? When perceiving his wife, the sub-
ject intuitively develops and activates a person
schema. One aspect of the person schema is the
person’s identity.17 As the Capgras case nicely
illustrates, the registration of a person’s identity
is a result of an integration process that relies
not only on visual features but also on an impli-
cit  emotional  evaluation,  and  that  these  to-
gether trigger an explicit judgment. While the
17 The involvement of identity already at the level of implicit schemata
is supported by Haxby’s model of face perception according to which
we have to distinguish a core cognitive system involving the recogni-
tion of face identity and an extended cognitive system which is en-
abling the recognition of facial expression (Haxby et al. 2000).
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visual recognition fits, here the emotional evalu-
ation is inadequate and the feeling of familiarity
is lacking; and in the case of this disorder, the
Bayesian integration process for these features
leads to an implausible result,  since the emo-
tional  mistake  overrides  the  visual  adequate-
ness.  Thus,  the  Capgras  patient  has  an  ad-
equate person image of his wife but an incorrect
person schema, and the tension between the two
is solved by developing the (implausible) hypo-
thesis that she is an imposter. This analysis is
in line with two-factor theories of the Capgras
disorder, according to which two distinct factors
cause the phenomenon18: first, the lack of famili-
arity, and, second, a local breakdown of ration-
ality that enables the irrational belief-formation
on  the  basis  of  a  severely  disturbed  person
schema  (Davies et  al. 2001).19 Several  other
cases seem to be accounted for if we accept the
evidence for a two-factor theory of person mod-
elling—namely a first level of intuitive and im-
plicit person impression and a second level of
explicit person evaluation, which are described
respectively  as  intuitive  person  schemata  and
explicit person images.
A contrast  case  to  Capgras  syndrome is
the Fregoli syndrome, wherein a patient has the
delusional belief that one and the same person,
usually  a  persecutor,  is  following  her,  who  is
able to radically change his outer appearance.
The sufferer then connects people with rather
different outer appearances and treats them as
the same persecutor.  One explanation, still  in
need of testing, is that this time the feeling of
familiarity is developed too often, probably by
top-down initiation due to the delusional belief
18 In the literature there are discussed one-factor accounts to explain
mental disorders, e.g., in the case of schizophrenia (Gallagher 2004):
a top-down approach argues that disturbances of higher-order cogni-
tion is the only source for thought insertion (Stephens &  Graham
2000) while a bottom-up approach argues that thought insertation is
a product of disturbances of neural or basic cognitive processes (like
perception). Most of the recent accounts are hybrid account which
we call two-factor theories.
19 The fact that person identity as a component of person schema form-
ation is not only based on visual but also on an emotional evaluation
is supported by the case of prosopagnosia, i.e., the inability to recog-
nize the face of the person one is seeing, even though one is able to
see and perceive the rest of the person adequately. Despite the fact
that a person suffering from prosopagnosia is not able to see the fa-
miliarity of the face, we can measure increased skin conductance for
familiar but not unfamiliar faces, thereby demonstrating intact (al-
beit covert) emotional recognition of known others (de Haan et al.
1992; Tranel & Damasio 1985).
that the subject is being persecuted. The delu-
sional belief, together with an inadequate feel-
ing of familiarity, may explain the syndrome.20
But  again  we  need  to  distinguish  the  two
factors: a level of implicit feeling or impression,
and a level of explicit judgment. This time the
delusion produces a breakdown of rational judg-
ment formation, i.e.,  the person model  of  the
other is strongly influenced by the delusion: the
person schema formation may be largely intact
but has a local defect due to being dominated
by the delusional belief. In general, monothem-
atic  delusions  (delusions  about  a  single  belief
content) seem to rely on two factors (Coltheart
et  al. 2007):  “[o]ne  factor  has  to  explain  the
strange  experiences  patients  claim  to  have,
while the other factor has to explain the misat-
tribution of actions and thoughts” (Vosgerau &
Newen 2007, p. 40).
Are there nonpathological everyday cases
that  support  the  distinction  between  person
schema and person image? One illustration can
be  drawn  from  Mark  Twain’s  “Huckleberry
Finn.” At first Huck helps the slave Jim to es-
cape from slavery; but then he rethinks his sup-
port in the light of the law, and forms the judg-
ment that he should turn him in to the slave-
hunters. But when he has the opportunity to do
so, Huck actually ends up protecting Jim. Why
does he do this? Huck has a person schema of
Jim that is constituted by a person impression
according to personal interactions that are dom-
inated by empathy; thus he has a positive im-
pression of Jim and there exists between them a
growing friendship. On the other hand, he has a
person image of Jim that is dominated by the
fact that he is a slave, such that he has to ac-
cept his role in society, to do the hard work, to
live without freedom, and thus that it is forbid-
den to aid his escape. Cases of tension between
an  intuitive  person  impression  (being  helpful,
being peaceful) and a person image dominated
by the  knowledge  that  the  same  person  is  a
pathological  murderer  are  often  reported  by
judges and policemen. A less dramatic tension
seems to be part of our everyday experience of
“false” friends (we may still think of someone as
20 For a discussion of delusional phenomena, see Coltheart et al. (2007)
and Hirstein (2005).
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a friend while implicitly already noticing signs
of unfair treatment), though of course the ten-
sion can also exist the other way around. As il-
lustrated above, the visual features of a person
are often loaded with social information, and of-
ten involve the activation of negative prejudices
which, after a more careful investigation of the
person, can be opposed by a positive person im-
age. The general functional role of person mod-
els is to simplify the structuring and evaluation
of social situations, to enable a quick evaluation
of the person in a given situation, and to initi-
ate adequate behaviour.  An additional  special
functional role of person models consists in sta-
bilizing  my  self-estimation,  since  there  is  a
strong tendency to have positive stereotypes of
one’s own in-group members and negative ste-
reotypes  of  the  out-groups’  (see  Volz 2008,
p. 19). These examples illustrate not only that
we need to distinguish the person schema and
person image, but also that we have a tendency
towards harmonizing both. Thus, if one of them
is disturbed we tend to adjust the other, which
may result not only in wrong judgments about
persons, but in extreme cases may become an
aspect of a mental disorder, as described above.
Finally, to distinguish them is compatible with
the claim that a person image may often gradu-
ally evolve on the basis of a person schema such
that  partially  the  same  information  about  a
person changes the status of accessibility from
implicit to explicit. But we also have to distin-
guish both kinds of person models because often
an  implicit  representation  of  a  person  as  un-
friendly  exists  simultaneously  with an explicit
evaluation of the same person as friendly. 
5.5 Person model theory (PMT) and its 
relation to other main theories
The central claim of PMT is that we organize
information  about  others  by  forming  person
models.  We account  for  a  multiplicity  of  epi-
stemic access strategies, while direct perception
and interaction are the main source for person
schema  formation.  Person  image  formation  is
based on all the epistemic strategies we have ex-
amined,  including  theory-based  inferences  and
(high-level) simulation strategies. Why, then, is
PMT not a version of TT? Person models are
more  general  and  allow  for  a  unification  of
rather  parsimonious  information  about  a  per-
son, which does not warrant being called a the-
ory since it does not form even a minimal pack-
age of systematically-interconnected beliefs. As
we learn more and more about the same person,
our person model  may develop into a theory.
Thus, this is  not to deny that we often have
rich person models that are theories; and thus I
can account for the empirical evidence that sup-
porters of TT tend to rely on. A further ques-
tion concerns how PMT is related to ST. Simu-
lation is one epistemic strategy in which person
models are used to understand others: if I have
evidence that another person is similar to me in
relevant respects, then I may use my self-model,
either the self-schema or the self-image, to pro-
duce  an  explanation  or  a  prediction  of  the
other’s behaviour. But I also often have clear
knowledge that the other is different from me in
relevant  respects,  especially  when  there  are
great differences in the three main categories—
sex, age, and race—or in cultural background.
In such cases simulation is not used. Although
simulation is a worthy epistemic strategy, it is
only of limited and constrained use in everyday
understanding. How is PMT related to interac-
tion theory and direct  perception theories?  It
explicitly accepts the important role of both as
epistemic strategies, but insists that in addition
to understanding others in situations of direct
interaction there is also often an understanding
of others just by observation. The use of these
two strategies seems to depend heavily on the
personality traits of the person who aims to un-
derstand another: while extroverts mainly rely
on interaction, introverts (who avoid social con-
tact) mainly rely on observation. Furthermore,
these  theories  do  not  offer  an  answer  to  the
main question addressed in this article, namely
how we organize  the  information  about  other
people that we already have. The narrative ac-
count offers one answer here, and again we can
account for  the role  of  narratives  that  in the
case  of  rather  rich  person  models  may  be
sources for creating or enriching the models fur-
ther, or they may also concern the way a person
model is memorized. But the narrative account
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alone ignores the strong relevance of our intuit-
ive understanding of others as it is anchored in
person schemata. This short overview, then, in-
dicates that all of the evidence that representat-
ives of other theories put forward can be integ-
rated into this view, while there is further evid-
ence for my theory, e.g., rich evidence that there
is  an  integration  of  information  into  person
models by person perception. Notably, PMT al-
lows us to account for certain mental disorders,
and I  have cited evidence from a very recent
fMRI study that is further supportive of the or-
ganization  of  information  according  to  person
models.
5.6 Widening PMT: Person models, 
situation models and culture
Does PMT give us the complete story about un-
derstanding  others?  What  about  my  under-
standing of a person whom I only see from be-
hind, when queuing at a self-service restaurant?
Here it seems sufficient to predict her behaviour
just by expecting her to act according to the so-
cial conventions of a self-service restaurant. Un-
derstanding the situation alone seems to be suf-
ficient for an understanding of and interaction
with the other.21 This is an important observa-
tion that suggests a widening of my theory: we
do not only create person models, but also situ-
ation models, and our understanding of others
uses both types of model as input and selects
the most helpful model for evaluating the other
person. If I have no person model of this indi-
vidual,  if  seeing someone from the back gives
me only very parsimonious information, and if I
am only  interested in  getting my lunch,  then
the situation model may be dominant in dealing
with persons in this context. As soon as min-
imal enrichment of person information is avail-
able we naturally tend to rely on person mod-
els. The fact that situation models are used at
all  is  supported by successful  artificial  intelli-
gence  (AI)  studies  working  with  scripts  and
21 These types of cases are considered in Gallagher & Hutto (2008), in
the section “Pragmatic Intersubjectivity”. Their view is close to a
multiplicity view. A minor criticism is that we have to account for
such cases  independently from being in interaction with someone.
They may also involve only observing the other.
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frames that can account for human behaviour
(Schank &  Abelson 1977).  Furthermore,  in
Asian  cultures  the  understanding  of  other
people seems to rely much more on social con-
ventions, since people are strongly expected to
behave according to these conventions. In gen-
eral,  situation models  are more important  for
understanding others in “collectivistic” cultures
than in individualistic cultures where explana-
tions and predictions of behaviour are usually
more reliant on individual belief–desire explana-
tions. Such observations as these require us to
give an account of situation models. This can be
easily  done by widening the theory of  under-
standing others such that it includes situation
models, as well as the interdependence of per-
sonal models and situation models. It can also
include  a  dynamic,  involving  bottom-up  and
top-down processes that lead to an activation or
construction of the most plausible person model
for  interacting  with,  explaining,  or  predicting
the behaviour of the other person.22 Here is a
rough outline of the process leading to under-
standing others in the rich sense of interacting,
such as in observing, explaining, or predicting
(see Figure 2).
In general, we should note the important
role of culture in shaping our way of modelling
persons  (Vogeley &  Roepstorff 2009).  As  we
have seen,  culture modulates  the relevance  of
person models in relation to situation models.
But it also influences our formation of person
models, for example by shaping our person per-
ception. To illustrate: Japanese individuals are
encouraged  to  be  sociable  and  cooperative
(Moskowitz et al. 1994), to be affiliative rather
than competitive (Yamaguchi et al. 1995), and
to show obligation to others (Oyserman et al.
1998).  Concerning  dominance  and  subordina-
tion, Japanese people learn to be rewarded for
subordinate  behaviour,  while  Americans  learn
to be  rewarded for  dominant  behaviour.  This
22 There is already one dynamic model of person construal available in
the literature that also supports my dynamic theory of understand-
ing others with person models, i.e., the model of Freeman & Ambady
(2011). Despite its merits in describing social perception in more de-
tail  as  regards  the  interrelation of  bottom-up and  top-down pro-
cesses, the authors neither account for the claim that our rich prior
information is mainly organized on the level of persons (not faces or
subpersonal  features),  nor  do  they  account  for  the  interaction
between person models and situation models.
also  shapes  the  perception  of  dominance  and
subordination  in  others.  Typical  neurological
activations of the mesolimbic reward system can
be shown to be shaped by the respective cul-
ture: Americans show a higher activation of this
system when doing and seeing dominant beha-
viour  (in  contrast  to  subordinate  behaviour)
while with Japanese people we can observe the
opposite: they show a higher activation of ex-
actly the same system when doing and seeing
subordinate  behaviour  (Freeman et  al. 2009).
Thus, the perception of dominant and subordin-
ate behaviour is connected with opposite evalu-
ations  (Americans  highly  esteem  dominance
while Japanese people highly esteem subordin-
ate behaviour) and a different set of personality
traits. Cultural influences on the psychological
and neural level are also reported for self-mod-
els:  on  the  psychological  level,  the  difference
between  an  Asian  interdependent  self  and  a
Western  independent  self  was  reported  by
Markus & Kitayama (1991), while a respective
difference in neural correlates was also recently
discovered (Sui & Han 2007).
6 Conclusion
Our understanding of other minds is based epi-
stemically  on  a  multiplicity  of  strategies,  the
core strategies being direct perception, interac-
tion,  simulation,  and  theory-based  inferences
(including learning from narratives). The most
important aspect of understanding others is the
activation of prior knowledge of individuals or
groups of persons. This is organized into person
models. The main claim of PMT is that we rely
on  person models to understand others. These
person models form the basis for perceiving and
evaluating persons, their social behaviour, and
their  mind-set.  We develop person models  for
ourselves, for other individuals, and for groups
of  persons  (group  models).  Furthermore,  all
types of person models can be realized on two
levels: (implicit) person schemata and (explicit)
person images. A person schema is a bundle of
information  including  information  about  sens-
ory-motor abilities, voice, face, basic mental dis-
positions,  etc.,  and  such  schemata  are  intuit-
ively used, implicitly developed, and not usually
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easily accessible for linguistic report. A  person
image is a unity of explicitly-registered mental
and physical dispositions as well as situational
features  (like  perceptions,  emotions,  attitudes,
etc.)  that  is  usually  easily  accessible  for  lin-
guistic report (albeit sometimes with the help of
gesture, drawings, etc.). The PMT has several
advantages over existing accounts of social un-
derstanding (e.g., TT, ST, and interaction the-
ory), since it can account for all of the following
criteria: 
1. It  explains specific and more general  social
understanding  of  particular  individuals  in
terms of individual person models and group
person models. (Not accounted for in ST.)
2. It accounts for the difference, for which evid-
ence  is  presented,  between implicit,  intuitive
forms of social understanding and explicit de-
liberative ones by appealing to the role of per-
son schemata and person images respectively.
(Not accounted for in interaction theory.)
3. It does justice to folk-psychological evidence
that  we  understand  very  familiar  persons
much better than unfamiliar ones: We have
rich person images of individuals with whom
we are  very familiar.  (Deficit  of  all  former
theories.)
4. It marks adequately in what ways our under-
standing of others and our self-understanding
are interdependent, e.g., in special cases of sim-
ulation, understanding the other relies on self-
models. (Generally not accounted for in TT.)
5. It  offers  an  adequate  framework that  is  in
line with the best explanations of some men-
tal diseases in understanding others, such as
the Capgras and Fregoli syndromes. (Deficit
of ST.)
6. It can account for cultural differences in so-
cial understanding: Future research will show
how person models vary with culture, and we
have already illustrated that it varies in the
case of self-models between Asian and West-
ern  cultures.  (Not  accounted  for  in  any
former theory.)
Thus, PMT is at least a serious alternative ac-
count, and certainly a candidate for future in-
vestigation.
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